The traditional Linux security model starts with file permissions. The model lets the kernel decide whether or not a process may access a resource based on permissions set as part of the filesystem. The coarse-grained granularity of this model often causes Linux processes to have too many rights. If more granularity is needed, one has to resort to adding security related code into the program source.
This series of articles is about Linux namespaces, a lightweight virtualization technology implemented in Linux kernel. In part 1 I’ve talked about building chroot jails using mount namespace, and in part 2 I’ve looked into isolating processes using PID namespace. The next step is to isolate the TCP/IP networking stack using network namespaces.
Security at this level is always reactive. Assuming the bad guy breaks into your server, he will realize he doesn’t have root privileges (classic Unix privilege separation implemented in server software), he runs on top of a fake filesystem (chroot), and he cannot get outside on the network. The later is usually done by placing the computer in a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) behind a firewall.
The same effect can be achieved on the cheap using Linux namespaces. For this, I place the server in a container (vm1) running its own network segment (10.10.20.0/24). The container is connected to the host through a Linux bridge interface (br0). On the host I configure iptables firewall, isolating the server and effectively limiting the potential damage that could be inflicted on the larger network. The final setup looks like this:
Linux ptrace() system call provides a means by which one process may observe and control the execution of another process. It is primarily used to implement breakpoint debugging with gdb and system call tracing with strace. In this article I will look at the security implications of ptrace, and how to overcome them using Linux PID namespaces.
Public enemy numero uno
This is an experiment every Linux enthusiast should try. Start an ssh connection in a terminal and stop when you are just about to enter the password:
Starting an ssh session
Open another terminal, find the pid of your ssh session (ps ax | grep ssh) and start strace on it (strace -p 3660). Then, go back to your ssh terminal, type in your password, and watch it flying across strace terminal:
ptrace usage example
Namespace isolation is the simplest virtualization technology available in Linux kernel. It allows a process and all its descendants to have their own private view of the globally shared kernel resources, such as the network stack, process table, mount table. This feature is mostly popularized and promoted by utilities such as LXC (Linux Containers), Docker and virtenv.
Three syscalls are used to create Linux namespaces, unshare(), clone() and setns(). In this article I will take a look at unshare() and show how to use it directly in your scripts and programs without going through LXC or any other higher level virtualization tool.
I’ll start by investigating unshare command available in util-linux package, and from there I’ll move to the system call. In the end I’ll build a small C program that isolates a web browser such as Mozilla Firefox into a kernel namespace.
This is a simple telnet client written in C. In the negotiation phase of the connection it will respond with WONT to any DO coming from the server, and it will encourage the server to DO anything it offers with WILL. The only exception is the screen size setting, advertised as 24 x 80 by the client.